Intentional retrieval suppression can conceal guilty knowledge in ERP memory detection tests  by Bergström, Zara M. et al.
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Brain-activity  markers  of  guilty  knowledge  have  been  promoted  as  accurate  and  reliable  measures  for
establishing  criminal  culpability.  Tests  based  on  these  markers  interpret  the  presence  or  absence  of
memory-related  neural  activity  as diagnostic  of  whether  or  not  incriminating  information  is  stored  in
a  suspect’s  brain.  This  conclusion  critically  relies  on the  untested  assumption  that reminders  of  a crime
uncontrollably  elicit  memory-related  brain  activity.  However,  recent  research  indicates  that,  in  somepisodic retrieval
vent-Related Potentials
emory  suppression
uilty  knowledge
ognitive control
circumstances,  humans  can  control  whether  they  remember  a previous  experience  by  intentionally
suppressing  retrieval.  We  examined  whether  people  could  use  retrieval  suppression  to  conceal  neural
evidence  of incriminating  memories  as  indexed  by Event-Related  Potentials  (ERPs).  When  people  were
motivated  to suppress  crime  retrieval,  their  memory-related  ERP  effects  were  signiﬁcantly  decreased,
allowing  guilty  individuals  to  evade  detection.  Our  ﬁndings  indicate  that  brain  measures  of  guilty  knowl-
edge  may  be under  criminals’  intentional  control  and  place  limits  on  their  use in  legal  settings.. Introduction
Recent suggestions that technological advances now allow
s to decode criminal guilt from brain activity data have gen-
rated intensive interdisciplinary debate within the scientiﬁc
ommunity (Garland & Glimcher, 2006; Greely & Illes, 2007; Sip,
oepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008; Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben,
005). Several emerging companies are advertising commercial
mplementations of brain activity guilt detection (e.g. No Lie
RI, http://www.noliemri.com/; Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories,
ttp://www.brainwavescience.com/),  and attempts to introduce
vidence from such tests in criminal trials are frequently reported
n international media (Giridharadas, 2008; McCall, 2004; Miller,
010). However, despite widespread interest and discussion,
mpirical data concerning the validity of these brain activity-based
ethods is sparse. One prominent concern is that most research
o date has been conducted on compliant participants with little
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01227 827507; fax: +44 01227 827030.
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motivation to hide their guilt, whereas real criminals may  use
countermeasure strategies to avoid detection. In view of the impor-
tant societal, legal and ethical implications of brain activity crime
detection, it is vital to validate these methods before they are widely
adopted, and, in particular, to evaluate how well they work for
uncooperative suspects motivated to conceal incriminating knowl-
edge.
Memory detection aims to establish culpability by determining
from physiological or behavioural correlates of memory retrieval
whether a suspect has knowledge of a crime that only a guilty per-
son would possess (Meegan, 2008). Scalp-recorded Event-Related
Potentials (ERPs) are often used in these types of test as inexpen-
sive and non-invasive measures of real-time neural activity (e.g.
Allen, Iacono, & Danielson, 1992; Rosenfeld, Angell, Johnson, &
Qian, 1991; Van Hooff, Brunia, & Allen, 1996). ERPs have gained
popularity as an alternative to traditional autonomic measures in
memory detection studies (Lykken, 1959; see Ben-Shakhar & Elaad,
2003, for review), partly because the rapid and process-speciﬁc
brain responses reﬂected in ERPs are believed to be more resis-
tant to countermeasures than other physiological and behavioural
Open access under CC BY license.measures (e.g. Lykken, 1998; see discussion in Ben-Shakhar, 2011).
Recently however, researchers have challenged this assumption,
showing that ERP memory detection tests may  be more vul-
nerable than previously thought (e.g. Mertens & Allen, 2008;
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osenfeld, 2006; Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004, although
ee Rosenfeld et al., 2008). In this paper, we describe a counter-
easure that has not been explored before in the literature, which
uestions one of the fundamental assumptions of brain-activity
emory detection.
In  an ERP version of a typical guilty knowledge test (GKT, Lykken,
959), ERPs are recorded while participants engage in a crime-
rrelevant target detection task that includes reminders of some
ncriminating information (e.g. Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Farwell
 Smith, 2001). Participants are asked to discriminate between a
et of target items (for example words presented on a computer
creen) and another set of irrelevant control items (other words)
y pressing one button for targets and another for irrelevants.
his procedure produces an enlarged positive mid-parietal com-
onent termed the “P300” (see Polich, 2007, for review) in the ERP
aveform around 300–900 ms  speciﬁcally after target presenta-
ions, thought to index processes related to participants’ conscious
ecognition of targets as meaningful stimuli. Because P300 ampli-
udes are typically inversely related to the subjective probability of
 stimulus (Donchin, 1981), a small proportion of targets are typ-
cally intermixed with a larger proportion of irrelevants to make
argets subjectively rare, thus enhancing P300 differences. Cru-
ially, to assess the presence or absence of guilty knowledge, a
mall proportion of crime reminders (“probes”) are also presented
s part of the irrelevant set. To truly innocent suspects, such crime
robes are indistinguishable from irrelevant items and thus elicit
o special brain response. To guilty suspects, the probes stand out
ased on their crime-related memory status, and this recognition
licits an enhanced parietal P300 similar to targets. Thus, guilty
uspects show enlarged parietal P300s to both probes and targets
ince both types elicit recognition, whereas innocent suspects only
how enlarged parietal P300s to targets and not to probes.
Memory detection tests make the crucial assumption that
eminders of incriminating information uncontrollably elicit
ecognition-related brain activity. This assumption gains plausi-
ility from the fact that the GKT memory probes directly name
etails from the crime, thus constituting exceedingly potent
etrieval cues for a personally signiﬁcant event, making it appear
xtremely unlikely that if a related memory is present, the cue
ill not automatically evoke recognition and its neural mark-
rs. The inevitability of such retrieval is questioned, however, by
ecent evidence that the brain activity correlates of general mem-
ry retrieval may  be under more voluntary control than has been
reviously assumed (e.g. Dzulkiﬂi & Wilding, 2005; Herron & Rugg,
003; Rissman, Greely, & Wagner, 2010). So far, the strongest evi-
ence that memory retrieval can be intentionally prevented stems
rom the Think/No-Think (TNT) memory suppression paradigm
Anderson & Green, 2001). In this task, participants are trained
n pairs of stimuli (typically weakly related words), and are later
resented with the ﬁrst item of each pair as a reminder, and
re asked to either think of the associate item (the Think con-
ition), or to completely prevent the associate from coming to
ind by suppressing retrieval (the No-Think condition). Think and
o-Think reminders are repeatedly presented, typically randomly
ntermixed in equal proportions. fMRI evidence from this paradigm
uggests that people can engage response override mechanisms
ediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex to suppress retrieval
y modulating memory-related activity in the hippocampus in
esponse to reminders (Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit & Anderson,
012; Butler & James, 2010; Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007; Levy &
nderson, 2012; Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Anderson, & Bunge, 2013).
Most  critically for memory guilt detection research which is pre-
ominantly ERP-based, asking participants to suppress unwanted
emories in a TNT task causes memory-speciﬁc reductions of an
RP effect with similar polarity, topography and timing to the P300
omponent (Bergström, De Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009a,l Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11
2009b;  Bergström, Velmans, De Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn,
2007; Hanslmayr, Leipold, Pastötter, & Bäuml, 2009; Mecklinger,
Parra, & Waldhauser, 2009). However, these ﬁndings have been
interpreted as voluntary suppression of the ERP marker of episodic
recollection, which is speciﬁcally correlated with the amount of
episodic detail that is consciously recollected in response to a
reminder (e.g. Vilberg, Moosavi, & Rugg, 2006; see Rugg & Curran,
2007, for review). Because of their similar characteristics, parietal
effects related to recollection and “classic” P300 effects related to
stimulus evaluation are difﬁcult to tease apart. This is particularly
the case in tasks where episodic reminders are subjectively rare,
such as the GKT, since recollection-related and classic P300 effects
may both contribute to parietal ERP amplitudes. The episodic rec-
ollection effect is however more likely to be left-lateralized than
P300 effects. Furthermore, although the P300 is highly sensitive to
subjective probability, the parietal recollection effect may  not be
(Herron, Quale, & Rugg, 2003; see also Smith & Guster, 1993). These
ERP effects are thus thought to index separable cognitive processes,
although the precise relationship between them is still unclear.
The  implications of the aforementioned research for criminal
guilt detection tests nevertheless remain to be established, since
there are many features of such tests that have not yet been
explored in the context of retrieval suppression. No research has
examined whether retrieval-related brain activity can be inten-
tionally suppressed for objects or events directly named by the
reminder itself, in particular when comparing these potent cues to
novel control cues that are unlikely to elicit memory-related brain
activity. Moreover, it remains unclear whether memory-related
brain activity can be suppressed when reminders are subjectively
rare, as in typical GKT research. If mnemonic control is possible
under conditions of exceedingly strong and subjectively unex-
pected retrieval cues however, it raises the possibility that guilty
suspects motivated to conceal their knowledge may be able to sup-
press brain activity elicited by incriminating probes during memory
testing and hence elude detection.
Furthermore, prior TNT research has shown that repeatedly
suppressing retrieval in response to a reminder can dramatically
reduce the ubiquitous beneﬁcial effects of reminders on reten-
tion, and even impair recall performance of the avoided memories
compared to items in a baseline condition that have been neither
recalled nor suppressed since initial learning (e.g. Anderson et al.,
2004; Anderson & Green, 2001; Bergström et al., 2009b; Depue
et al., 2007; see Anderson & Huddleston, 2011, for a review and
meta-analysis). This ﬁnding implies that retrieval suppression dur-
ing a guilt detection test may  be successful to the extent of actually
impairing later retention of the incriminating memories.
To  determine whether people can control brain responses to
reminders that might be expected to elicit incriminating recog-
nition, we created a novel design that combined elements from
both GKT and TNT paradigms, and asked participants to voluntarily
suppress memories of a simulated crime. ERPs were recorded dur-
ing three phases of a memory detection test that directly probed
central details from a previous home burglary simulation. In one
control phase, participants were truly innocent of the tested crime.
In a second “guilty cooperative” phase, participants were asked to
remember their crime. Finally, in a third “guilty uncooperative”
phase, participants were asked to suppress crime recall to evade
detection. Following the guilty knowledge test, we  compared mem-
ory for repeatedly suppressed and repeatedly remembered crime
details to memory for other details that were encountered during
the initial burglary simulation but did not appear in the interven-
ing detection phase (i.e. a baseline condition), to assess whether
retrieval suppression of crime memories had lasting effects on
memory accessibility.
The  relative probabilities of item categories were varied
across two  experiments. Mirroring prior TNT research, the ﬁrst
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xperiment presented each category with equal probability, which
llowed an assessment of whether retrieval-related activity to
xceedingly strong reminders of a crime can be voluntarily
uppressed in the absence of probability effects. The second exper-
ment reduced the probability of probes and targets to investigate
hether the neural response to crime reminders can be sup-
ressed even when probes are subjectively unexpected. If people
an suppress crime recall when motivated to do so, parietal P3001
mplitudes for probes should be reduced in the guilty uncoop-
rative phase compared to the guilty cooperative phase, leading
o signiﬁcantly poorer guilt detection rates. If they are perfectly
uccessful at suppressing retrieval, P300 amplitudes during sup-
ression of guilty knowledge should be indistinguishable from
hose observed during the innocent control phase.
. Materials and methods
.1.  Participants
Experiment one included data from 24 right-handed native German speakers (15
emales) with a mean age of 24 (range 18–35). Experiment two included data from
4 right-handed native English speakers (14 females) with a mean age of 21 (range
8–35). All participants had no known history of neurological or psychiatric disease
nd had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and gave written informed consent.
xperiments were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the local Ethics
ommittees of the University of Magdeburg (Experiment one) and the University of
ambridge (Experiment two).
.2. Design, materials and procedure
Experiment one was  conducted in German at the Otto von Guericke Univer-
ity  of Magdeburg, Germany, whereas Experiment two  was conducted in English at
he University of Cambridge, UK. Visual and verbal materials were kept as similar
s possible across experiments. Both experiments consisted of three main phases:
1) an initial burglary simulation; (2) a memory detection phase, where ERPs were
ecorded; and (3) a ﬁnal test phase, where participants’ memory for the burglary
ask  was assessed.
Upon  arrival, participants completed the crime simulation task on a computer,
hich  was designed to lead to rich, elaborative memory encoding of 24 photographs
f  distinct common objects (e.g. a gold watch, drawn at random for each person from
 larger set of objects that were as semantically unrelated as possible) without inten-
ional learning attempts. Participants were asked to vividly imagine being a burglar
ho was  breaking into houses with the aim of stealing valuables. During each trial, a
icture of a room interior was presented ﬁrst, and participants were asked to imagine
hat they had broken into the room and judge whether they thought that particular
oom  was  likely to contain something valuable. Second, four numbers appeared on
he background, marking particular locations in the room (e.g. a drawer). Partic-
pants  were asked to search through the locations by pressing the corresponding
umbers  on the keyboard in order to ﬁnd a hidden object. When they pressed the
orrect option an object appeared, superimposed on the room picture. Next, partic-
pants completed three rating tasks on the object-room picture. First, they decided
hether the object was the kind of object they would expect to ﬁnd in the particular
oom.  Second, they rated its value, and third, decided whether they wanted to steal
t. There was  no upper time limit to respond and the computer only moved on to
he next question after a response had been recorded. Each of the judgements could
nly be given after a 4 s delay of viewing the picture, meaning that each trial was  a
inimum of 16 s long.
For each participant, words naming one randomly drawn subset of objects from
he burglary task (e.g. “watch”) were later presented as probes during the guilty
ooperative block, and words naming another subset of objects (also randomly
rawn)  were presented as probes during the guilty uncooperative block. The rest
f the study objects were not presented during the EEG phase, but were used as a
ehavioural baseline for the ﬁnal memory tests. Other object words for which the
ictures were not presented during study were randomly assigned to the target,
rrelevant and innocent probe ERP conditions, using a different set for each phase. prior control experiment (see next section) with an independent group that per-
ormed our simulated burglary task conﬁrmed that they recognised these crime
robes as referring to the previously encountered objects with ceiling accuracy,
nd  overwhelmingly rated these probes as eliciting automatic, involuntary recall of
1 We refer to the late parietal ERP positivity in these experiments as a P300 effect,
n line with typical GKT research. However, as discussed, the functional signiﬁcance
f  parietal ERP positivities in the P300 time-window is unclear, since these parietal
ositivities might be related both to stimulus evaluation processes and to episodic
ecollection.l Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11 3
the burglary objects. Thus, presenting these crime probes in our memory detection
test would be expected to strongly and reﬂexively elicit retrieval of the associated
objects  stored in memory.
Following  crime simulation, participants were ﬁtted with an EEG cap and com-
pleted the memory detection phase on a computer. They were told that reminder
words  that referred to objects from the burglary would be presented on the screen,
in order to try to make them remember details from the crime so that their brain
activity  could be used as criminal evidence. However, these reminder words would
be intermixed with other words that did not refer to the burglary while they were
performing a target detection task, which would be conducted in three blocks. Before
each block of the memory detection test, participants practiced a block-speciﬁc list
of target words and were instructed to detect and press one button whenever they
recognised a target word, and press another button for any other words (buttons
and  response hand counterbalanced across participants).
Following target learning, more speciﬁc instructions for the particular mem-
ory  detection block were given (order counterbalanced across participants). In the
guilty cooperative block, participants were instructed that if they recognised an
object word as corresponding to a picture seen during the crime simulation, they
should try to remember as many details as possible about that object from the bur-
glary (analogous to a blocked Think condition in the TNT paradigm). In the innocent
control  block, participants were told that they would be tested for a crime they had
not committed so should simply focus on the target detection task (with the reason-
ing that an innocent suspect in a real criminal investigation would of course know
themselves to be innocent).2 In the guilty uncooperative block, participants were
told to try their best to completely stop any memories of the crime from coming
to  mind at all, without self-distraction (analogous to a blocked No-Think condition,
with  instructions similar to direct suppression group in Bergström et al., 2009b;
Benoit  & Anderson, 2012). It was strongly emphasised in all phases that they should
always read and pay full attention to each word the entire time it was on the screen,
and only press the “recognition” button for targets and the “non-recognition” button
for any other words. Thus, there were no differences in overt response requirements
across  phases.
During each memory detection trial, words were presented for 2 s in white on
a black background, preceded by a 1 s white ﬁxation cross, and followed by a 0.5 s
green ﬁxation cross. Button presses and blinks were timed to the green ﬁxation in
order to avoid contaminating relevant EEG with motor-related artefacts. The propor-
tion of items in the probe, irrelevant and target categories was manipulated across
experiments. In Experiment one, each block contained an equal proportion of eight
items in each category, in line with previous memory suppression ERP research
that  has presented items to be suppressed at equal probability to other items (e.g.
Bergström et al., 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Hanslmayr et al., 2009; Mecklinger et al., 2009).
This list of 24 words was presented twelve times, randomly intermixed each time.
In Experiment two, each block contained four probes, sixteen irrelevants and four
targets, i.e. with probabilities of approximately 0.17, 0.67 and 0.17 respectively,
which  are typical proportions in guilty knowledge tests (Allen et al., 1992; Farwell
&  Donchin, 1991; Mertens & Allen, 2008; Rosenfeld et al., 2004), also presented
twelve  times each randomly intermixed.
Following the guilt detection phase, participants completed two ﬁnal tests that
aimed to detect whether the earlier retrieval suppression manipulation affected
later retention of the avoided memories. Memory was  compared for repeatedly
suppressed  object pictures (i.e. object pictures for which corresponding words were
presented as probes in the uncooperative phase) to repeatedly remembered object
pictures (i.e. object pictures for which corresponding words were presented as
probes in the cooperative phase) and to memory for baseline objects that were
simply  presented during the initial burglary simulation but did not appear in the
guilty knowledge test phase. Because recognition memory for objects themselves
was  likely to be at ceiling (as established in our validation study for probe words),
the  tests focused on more difﬁcult details of the encoding episode. All participants
completed  two  tests in the same order: location recall and object recall. For these
recall tests, participants were presented with all background room pictures together
with the four marked locations where they had searched for a hidden object. First,
they were asked to try to remember the location in which they had found the object
during the burglary simulation task. Next they were asked to recall the object that
they found in that location. There was  no limit to response times in either test, and
pictures stayed on the screen until an answer was given. Finally, participants com-
pleted a questionnaire where they rated their perceived difﬁculty and success at
suppressing crime details in the uncooperative block and their perceived difﬁculty2 One might worry that telling participants that they were innocent may have
somehow  led to different ERP effects in the innocent phase compared to the guilty
phases. Importantly however, to preview the results, this was not the case. There
were no measurable differences between target and irrelevant ERP waveforms
across  the three phases, demonstrating that ERPs in the innocent phase were not
affected by instructions.
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.3. Validation recognition test
In  order to validate that using object words as probes brought memories of
he  crime simulation to mind, an independent group of participants (N = 10) com-
leted the crime simulation followed by an old/new recognition test, where words
eferring to objects from the burglary were intermixed with new object words,
nd  participants judged whether a word corresponded to an object from the bur-
lary. If participants responded that they recognised an object word, they next rated
hether the burglary memory came to mind automatically or through intentional
ffort  when seeing the word.
.4. EEG recording and analysis
In  Experiment one, EEG was recorded referenced to the left mastoid using a
rainVision BrainAmp ampliﬁer from 60 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes embedded in an
asycap. In Experiment two, EEG was recorded referenced to Cz using a Electri-
al  Geodesic Netamps 200 system with a 128-channel HydroCel Geodesic Sensor
et. In both experiments, signals were acquired at 250 Hz (bandwidth 0.1–70 Hz)
nd analysed using EEGLAB 7 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The continuous EEG data
ere re-referenced to an average mastoid reference, ﬁltered digitally with a band-
ass of 0.3–30 Hz (two-way least-squares ﬁnite impulse response ﬁlter), and were
hen separated into epochs time-locked to the word stimulus onset. Concatenated
pochs  were corrected from artefacts using Independent Component Analysis (see
ergström et al., 2009b, for details). Any trials that still contained visible artefacts
ollowing  artefact correction were removed. Next, ERPs were formed for the probe,
rrelevant and target items within each guilty cooperative, guilty uncooperative and
nnocent block (i.e. nine ERP conditions in total) including only trials for which
articipants  gave a correct response within the allocated time. Only a very small
roportion of trials (8% in Experiment one and 6% in Experiment two) were deleted
n total after these exclusion criteria.
Based on our strong a priori hypotheses, we  followed a large body of previ-
us  P300 research by focusing the main analyses on the mid-parietal electrode site
Pz in 10/20 nomenclature), where P300 effects are consistently largest and where
elective analyses are typically focused in GKT research. Parietal ERP amplitudes
ere  ﬁrst analysed at the group level using parametric statistics. Because mem-
ry detection tests are meant to function as diagnostic tools for determining the
uilt of an individual person, we  also estimated the reliability of P300 differences
ithin  each participant’s single trial data using nonparametric bootstrap resam-
ling  (Efron & Tibshirani, 1986; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Prior to bootstrap analysis,
ndividual  EEG trials were further lowpass ﬁltered with an 8 Hz cut-off in order to
ncrease signal-to-noise ratio. Subsequently, for each participant, a set of individ-
al  trials of the same size as the original probe set were drawn at random with
eplacement, and averaged to create a bootstrapped probe ERP. The same proce-
ure was repeated using irrelevant trials, creating a bootstrapped irrelevant ERP. To
reate a bootstrapped “base-to-peak” measure (e.g. Rosenfeld et al., 2004), the max-
mum amplitude of the irrelevant P300 was  measured by ﬁnding the 100 ms-long
ime  window with the most positive amplitude within the range of 400–900 ms  (this
alue being the difference between the baseline and the P300 peak, since the epochs
ere baseline-corrected prior to bootstrapping), and this value was  subtracted from
he comparable probe P300 maximum amplitude, creating a P300 difference value.
sing 200 iterations of this procedure, a distribution of P300 difference values was
reated. In order to state with 95% conﬁdence that probe P300s were more positive
han irrelevant P300s, the value at 1.65 standard deviations below the mean of this
istribution of differences should be greater than zero.
We  compared bootstrap results for the base-to-peak P300 method above with
ootstrap tests of two other statistics, mean baseline-corrected mid-parietal ampli-
ude across the whole P300 time-window (400–900 ms)  and P300 peak-to-peak
ifference  (the difference between the maximum P300 amplitude value described
bove and the 100 ms-long time-window with the most negative value following the
300 peak up to a maximum latency of 1600 ms  post-stimulus; Soskins, Rosenfeld, &
iendam, 2001). Classiﬁcation rates across these statistics were compared at strict
95% conﬁdence) and liberal (90% conﬁdence) thresholds. Using these thresholds
nd  measures, individuals for which probe P300s were reliably more positive than
rrelevant P300s were identiﬁed and assigned as guilty.
In  order to facilitate comparing our classiﬁcation results with previous research,
e  also calculated Receiver-Operating Curves (ROC) and associated Area Under
urves (AUCs) from the bootstrap distributions by comparing hit-rates in the two
uilty conditions (i.e. the proportion of participants correctly identiﬁed as guilty in
hese conditions) with false alarm rates in the Innocent condition (i.e. proportion of
articipants incorrectly identiﬁed as guilty when innocent) across different thresh-
lds. The AUC provides a useful summary statistic of classiﬁcation performance
rrespective  of a particular threshold, allowing detection rates to be compared across
tudies that use different classiﬁcation criteria (see Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). The
UC ranges from 0 to 1, and whereas an AUC value of 1 means perfect classiﬁca-
ion  across all thresholds (people were always detected when guilty but never falsely
dentiﬁed as such when innocent, irrespective of the classiﬁcation threshold) an AUC
alue of 0.5 means classiﬁcation is at chance (people were no more likely to be clas-
iﬁed as guilty in the Guilty phase than the Innocent phase). AUC values smaller than
.5 mean that people were more likely to be wrongly classiﬁed as guilty when inno-
ent than correctly detected when actually guilty. A previous meta-analysis found al Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11
mean  AUC value of 0.87 across 42 GKT studies that used skin conductance measures
and  a mock-crime procedure similar to the current paradigm (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad,
2003) whereas a newer, still unpublished meta-analysis found a mean AUC of 0.93
across 32 GKT studies that used P300-based measures and a variety of protocols
(Ben-Shakhar,  personal communication).
In the current study, AUCs were calculated with the non-parametric trapezoid
method,  and the Cooperative vs. Innocent AUC was statistically compared against
the Uncooperative vs. Innocent AUC by estimating the standard errors of the AUCs
using jack-knife resampling and calculating a z-score for the difference, as rec-
ommended  by Hanley and Hajian-Tilaki (1997). The z-score formula included a
correction for correlations between AUCs induced by the within-subjects design,
as estimated by the correlation between the jack-knife pseudo-values (see Hanley
& Hajian-Tilaki, 1997, for details).
Finally, we  also conducted a whole-head analysis in order to investigate the pos-
sibility that although guilty suspects may  be successful at suppressing late positive
parietal  ERPs, their guilt may nevertheless be revealed by other ERP effects, such
as effects related to the cognitive control processes that are recruited to suppress
retrieval.  Previous research has indicated that these control processes are manifest
as early fronto-central or centro-parietal ERP negativities (Bergström et al., 2009a,
2009b; Mecklinger et al., 2009) or frontal slow-drift negativities (Hanslmayr et al.,
2009). Because of the exploratory nature of this question, we  used a data-driven
approach  with multivariate non-rotated spatiotemporal Partial Least Squares (PLS,
McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004). PLS is a powerful technique that allows examination
of  distributed patterns of spatial and temporal dependencies in the ERP data with
minimal assumptions regarding the timing and distribution of potential effects.
PLS  analyzes the “cross-block” covariance between a matrix of dependent meas-
ures  (the spatiotemporal ERP distribution) and a set of exogenous measures, in this
case orthogonal contrast vectors representing differences between experimental
conditions  (the number of contrasts equal to the degrees of freedom), thereby con-
straining the solution to covariance attributable to the experimental manipulation.
In  nonrotated PLS (Bergström et al., 2009a, 2009b; McIntosh & Lobaugh, 2004) the
sums of squares of the cross-block covariance between each contrast matrix and
the spatiotemporal data matrix are directly tested for signiﬁcance using random
permutation  test.
In  the current analysis, PLS was  conducted separately for each of the three detec-
tion  phases, each phase split into early (0–400 ms), middle (400–800 ms) and late
(800–1200 ms)  time-windows in order to increase temporal resolution. Two  con-
trasts, one testing the difference between probes and irrelevants and another testing
the difference between probes and targets were assessed for signiﬁcance in each
time-window with 1000 permutations.
3. Results
3.1. Validation recognition test and post-test questionnaire
The recognition test conﬁrmed that participants could discrim-
inate between crime reminders and new words with very high
accuracy (98% correct, SEM 0.7%) and very high conﬁdence (average
rating 2.9 (SEM 0.02) on a 1–3 scale where 3 is highly conﬁ-
dent and 1 is not conﬁdent), and that crime memories came to
mind very automatically (average rating 3.9 (SEM 0.06) on a 1–4
scale where 4 is automatic recall and 1 highly effortful recall). The
validation test thus conﬁrmed that crime objects were strongly
encoded, and that presenting these crime probes in our mem-
ory detection test would be expected to strongly and reﬂexively
elicit retrieval of the associated objects stored in memory. Con-
sistent with this expectation, participants retrospectively judged
uncooperative recall suppression to be more effortful (t(47) = 14.9,
P < 0.0001; Cohen’s d = 2.89, calculated as the difference between
means divided by the pooled standard deviation to ensure unbi-
ased effect size estimates; Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996)
and less successful (t(47) = 11.1, P < 0.0001, d = 2.28) than cooper-
ative crime recall, which did not interact with experiment. This
ﬁnding indicates that recall in response to direct cues to crime
related objects was  highly automatic and had to be intentionally
suppressed, and that effortful suppression was recruited in both
experiments.
3.2. Focal ERP results at the mid-parietal site3.2.1. Group level analyses
In  both experiments, group average ERPs at mid-parietal elec-
trode sites showed large voluntary modulations of ERPs to crime
Z.M. Bergström et al. / Biological Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11 5
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opographic maps show the mean difference between probes and irrelevants betw
robes depending on instructions to recall or suppress crime
emories (Fig. 1), with larger probe P300s during crime recall
han crime suppression. The scalp maps show that the average
ifference between probes and irrelevants between 450 and 800 ms
n the cooperative phase displayed the canonical enhancement
ften found in guilty knowledge studies, relative to the innocent
hase. In contrast, when subjects were uncooperative and sup-
ressed retrieval, this enhancement was wilfully avoided. Statistics
n mean ERP amplitudes between 450 and 800 ms  (when the
300 effect was maximal) at the mid-parietal electrode conﬁrmed
hat at the group level, voluntary modulations of memory-related
300 effects were successful, as revealed by signiﬁcant interactions
etween the critical item categories (probe/irrelevant) and guilty
hase (guilty cooperative/guilty uncooperative) in both experi-
ents (Experiment one: F(1,23) = 5.57, P < 0.05, Partial 2 = 0.20;
xperiment two: F(1,23) = 10.19, P < 0.01, Partial 2 = 0.31). These
nteractions between item type and guilty phase were not signiﬁ-
antly modulated by the order in which participants completed the
ifferent phases, since adding phase order as a between subjectswithin blocks in Experiment one (left column) and Experiment two (right column).
0 and 800 ms.
variable  did not change the signiﬁcance of the two-way interac-
tions in either experiment, and the three-way interactions between
phase order × item type × guilty phase were not signiﬁcant (both
Fs < 1, P > 0.7).
Planned t-tests revealed that in Experiment one when partici-
pants were in the cooperative phase, probes elicited more positive
parietal P300s than irrelevants, (t(23) = 3.1, P < 0.01, d = 0.48), repli-
cating prior research with memory detection tests, although target
P300s were still slightly larger than probe P300s (t(23) = 2.8,
P < 0.05, d = 0.31). By stark contrast, when participants were asked
to be uncooperative and suppress their knowledge in Experiment
one, their ERPs bore remarkable resemblance to those observed in
the innocent phase: probe P300s were not different from irrelevant
P300s in either the uncooperative phase (t < 1, n.s., d = 0.03) in which
crime knowledge was  present in memory, or in the innocent phase
(t = 1, n.s., d = 0.14) in which a crime memory was absent. Signiﬁ-
cantly larger P300s to targets than to probes were observed in both
innocent (t(23) = 5.3, P < 0.001, d = 0.77) and uncooperative phases
(t(23) = 4.1, P < 0.001, d = 0.71).
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In Experiment two, where targets and probe categories were
f lower probability than irrelevant items, parietal P300s to tar-
ets were indeed almost twice the magnitude of target P300s
n Experiment one, consistent with previous evidence that P300
ize is often inversely related to stimulus probability (Donchin,
981). P300 amplitudes to probes were also enhanced in the
ow probability experiment, in particular in the cooperative
hase where probe P300s were signiﬁcantly more positive than
rrelevant P300s (t(23) = 6.0, P < 0.001, d = 1.03), although target
300s were still larger than probe P300s (t(23) = 3.1, P < 0.01,
 = 0.48). In the uncooperative phase, probe P300s were enhanced
ompared to irrelevant P300s (t(23) = 2.9, P < 0.01, d = 0.48), indi-
ating that suppression of memory-related activity was  somewhat
ess pronounced with low probability than with equal probabil-
ty crime reminders. Similarly to Experiment one, targets were
ssociated with signiﬁcantly larger P300s than probes in both
nnocent (t(23) = 7.6, P < 0.001, d = 1.81) and uncooperative phases
t(23) = 6.7, P < 0.001, d = 0.99) of Experiment two.
It is necessary to show that the reduced neural response to
rime probes in Experiments one and two was not due to some
hase-generic process such as paying less attention to all items
uring the uncooperative phase, but rather a genuine and targeted
ffort to control memory. Comparing ERPs across the cooperative,locks in Experiment one (left column) and Experiment two (right column).
uncooperative, and innocent phases (Fig. 2) showed that the vol-
untary modulations of P300s were memory-speciﬁc because they
were restricted to crime probes (dashed boxes), with no modu-
lations of target or irrelevant P300s. T-tests revealed no reliable
differences in P300 amplitude for targets or for irrelevants in either
experiment (all ts ≤ 1, all ds < 0.17). In contrast, P300 responses to
probe items were signiﬁcantly reduced in the uncooperative com-
pared to the cooperative phase in both Experiment one (t(23) = 2.7,
P < 0.05, d = 0.50) and Experiment two  (t(23) = 3.0, P < 0.01, d = 0.52).
In Experiment one, P300 responses to probes during the uncooper-
ative phase were reduced to the point of being indistinguishable
from probes during the innocent phase (t < 1, n.s., d = 0.07); in
Experiment two, uncooperative probe P300s were more positive
than innocent probe P300 amplitudes (t(23) = 2.3, P < 0.05, d = 0.57),
conﬁrming that suppression was  not complete in the low probabil-
ity experiment, though clearly successful to a signiﬁcant extent.
These ﬁndings converge to indicate that modulations of P300
amplitude were entirely selective to crime probes, reﬂecting vol-
untary modulations of memory-speciﬁc brain activity.3.2.2. Individual guilt classiﬁcation
The  overall pattern of results in the individual guilt classi-
ﬁcation bootstrap analysis was  consistent across statistics and
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bZ.M. Bergström et al. / Bioonﬁdence thresholds (Fig. 3). These results show that bootstrap
esting of base-to-peak P300 and mean P300 amplitudes produced
ore accurate classiﬁcation than the P300 peak-to-peak method,
n particular for Experiment one. Using a strict threshold of 95% CI
ig. 3. Percentage of participants classiﬁed as guilty using different statistics for the
ootstrap test at different guilt classiﬁcation thresholds.l Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11 7
resulted in acceptable false positive rates for all statistics, whereas a
liberal threshold of 90% CI resulted in reduced speciﬁcity (in partic-
ular for the base-to-peak and peak-to-peak P300 statistics), without
much increase in sensitivity. With a liberal 90% conﬁdence level,
an unacceptably high percentage of participants were erroneously
classiﬁed as guilty in the innocent phase (i.e. false alarms) for
the base-to-peak and peak-to-peak P300 measures (approx. 30%).
All measures showed more reasonable false alarm rates (12.5% or
lower) with a strict 95% conﬁdence threshold, except the peak-
to-peak measure which was still rather high in Experiment two
(17%). The peak-to-peak measure was also particularly insensi-
tive at discriminating between probes and irrelevants across all
phases in Experiment one, likely because the post-P300 negative
peak (Soskins et al., 2001) was  not very pronounced with equal
probability probes.3
In Experiment one, for all measures, the percentage of individ-
ual participants classiﬁed as guilty was  highly similar across the
innocent phase, in which there was  no crime knowledge, and the
uncooperative phase, in which the participant had guilty knowl-
edge. This similarity between innocent and uncooperative phases
contrasted with the cooperative phase, in which detection rates
were notably higher (with the exception of the peak-to-peak mea-
sure, as described above). In Experiment two  with infrequent guilty
knowledge probes, correct detection rates during the guilty phases
of the experiment were overall higher than in Experiment one. Even
under these more favourable conditions, however, suppressing
crime memories substantially reduced detection rates compared
to when participants recalled their crime.
On closer inspection, around half of participants in Experiment
one did not show reliable P300 enhancements to targets compared
to irrelevant items with any particular measure. The low detection
rate in this experiment was thus likely a result of reduced signal-
to-noise (SNR) ratio because of overall smaller P300s when probes
were presented more frequently. In order to assess the pattern of
detection for subjects with good SNR, we also tested classiﬁcation
for each measure and threshold when including only participants
that showed a reliable target-irrelevant difference in that analy-
sis (since this difference can be considered a benchmark against
which the probe-irrelevant difference can be compared, e.g. Farwell
& Donchin, 1991, see also Iacono, 2007), as presented in Table 1.
In Experiment one, these analyses selectively enhanced detection
rates during the cooperative phases by on average 24% whereas
average detection rates for the uncooperative phases were only
increased by 4%. In Experiment two, the majority of participants had
reliable target-irrelevant differences so the conditionalised analysis
only increased average detection rates by 4% in both phases. Thus,
when including only high SNR participants, cooperative guilt clas-
siﬁcation was more similar across equiprobable and rare probes.
Importantly for our conclusions, the conditionalised analysis con-
ﬁrmed that the low uncooperative detection rate in Experiment one
was not due to low SNR. Rather, low SNR appeared to obscure the
difference between cooperative and uncooperative phases, since
this difference was  enhanced when participants that failed to show
reliable target-irrelevant differences were excluded.
3 The peak-to-peak P300 measure has been proposed as superior for detecting
guilty  knowledge compared to other bootstrap measures (Soskins et al., 2001), and
our ﬁndings appear inconsistent with this argument. However, the peak-to-peak
measure  relies on accurately estimating the post-P300 negative peak that was not
very pronounced in our data, particularly in Experiment one. Since our experiments
(particularly  Experiment one) had some notable design differences from previous
GKT protocols, these differences may have altered the cognitive processes involved
during the task and thereby affected the ERP morphology. Thus, we do not think
our  results speak clearly to the issue of which bootstrap measure is generally most
effective for guilty knowledge detection across different paradigms.
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Table 1
Conditionalised guilt classiﬁcation and Area Under Curve results across experiments and bootstrap measures.
Phase CI Experiment one Experiment two
Base-to-peak Mean Peak-to-peak Base-to-peak Mean Peak-to-peak
% N % N % N % N % N % N
Conditionalised guilt classiﬁcation
Cooperative 95%  50 10 67 9 29 7 76 21 53 17 70 20
90% 58 12 63 11 33 9 73 22 76 21 82 22
Uncooperative 95% 14 7 10 10 11 9 39 23 28 18 55 22
90% 14 14 17 12 25 12 48 23 35 20 61 23
Innocent 95% 0 13 0 11 0 14 14 21 6 17 17 24
90% 13 15 25 12 20 15 32 22 5 19 33 24
Areas  under curves (standard errors in parentheses)
Cooperative vs. innocent 0.60 (0.08) 0.66 (0.07) 0.47 (0.08) 0.84 (0.07) 0.87 (0.06) 0.83 (0.06)
Uncooperative vs. innocent 0.47 (0.10) 0.52 (0.14) 0.45 (0.08) 0.69 (0.09) 0.70 (0.09) 0.76 (0.08)
AUC  difference paired Z-test
Z-score 1.61 1.62 0.17 2.13 2.34 1.10
P-value 0.054 0.053 0.431 0.017 0.010 0.077
Note: CI, conﬁdence interval; %, percentage of participants that had reliably larger P300s for probes than irrelevants out of those that also had reliable larger P300s for targets
than  irrelevants in the relevant analysis; N, number of participants included.
Table 2
Signiﬁcance values of the contrasts in the whole-head PLS analysis as estimated by 1000 permutations.
Phase Comparison Experiment one Experiment two
0–400 ms 400–800 ms  800–1200 ms  0–400 ms  400–800 ms  800–1200 ms
Cooperative Probes  vs. irrelevants 0.344 0.006 0.029 0.400 0.001 0.001
Probes  vs. targets 0.120 0.001 0.183 0.302 0.005 0.020
Uncooperative Probes  vs. irrelevants 0.619 0.345 0.390 0.216 0.158 0.450
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Mean  accuracy on the ﬁnal tests is presented in Table 3. On
the four-choice location accuracy task, performance was  above
chance in all conditions, but there were no signiﬁcant main
Table 3
Proportion correct responses across the location and object ﬁnal recall tests.
Test Condition Experiment one Experiment two
M SEM M SEM
Location Recall 0.65 0.05 0.63 0.05
Suppress 0.55 0.04 0.67 0.04Probes  vs. targets 0.023 0.000 
Innocent Probes  vs. irrelevants 0.758 0.748 
Probes  vs. targets 0.126 0.000 
The AUC summary measures of classiﬁcation performance
Table 1) conﬁrmed the general picture that, even though the
roup-level statistics were highly signiﬁcant, individual classiﬁ-
ation was overall poor in Experiment one. In Experiment two,
lassiﬁcation performance calculated on the basis of the Coop-
rative “hits” versus Innocent “false alarms” ROC was  similar to
revious skin-conductance GKT research (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad,
003) but still lower than previous P300-based GKT research
Ben-Shakhar, personal communication). Importantly, classiﬁca-
ion performance was lower in both experiments and using all
easures when calculated based on “hits” in the Uncooperative
ondition. Comparing the AUC measures with a jack-knife based
aired Z-test (Hanley & Hajian-Tilaki, 1997) revealed signiﬁcantly
r marginally signiﬁcantly higher Cooperative than Uncooperative
UC values for all bootstrap measures in both experiments, with the
xception of the peak-to-peak measure in Experiment one since
his measure failed to detect guilty knowledge in both phases of
xperiment one (Table 1). The AUC analysis thus conﬁrmed that the
uppression-induced reduction in individual detection rates was
ot dependent on arbitrary classiﬁcation cut-off points.
In  sum, the individual bootstrap results conﬁrmed that a size-
ble proportion of participants successfully suppressed crime
ecall and evaded detection. Although exact success rates varied
omewhat depending on the speciﬁc classiﬁcation method and
hreshold, the global pattern was consistent, with 22% more partic-
pants classiﬁed as guilty when cooperating than when suppressing
heir crime memories, averaged across experiments, measures and
hresholds..3. ERP whole-head PLS analysis
The result of the PLS analysis testing pairwise contrasts in
ach of the detection phases and time windows are presented0.236 0.042 0.000 0.009
0.950 0.787 1.000 0.907
0.229 0.002 0.000 0.001
in  Table 2. There were highly signiﬁcant whole-head differences
between targets and probes in all detection phases in both exper-
iments, with the difference being maximally signiﬁcant in the
400–800 ms  time-window. The whole-head difference between
probes and irrelevants was  also highly signiﬁcant during the coop-
erative phases, between 400 and 800 ms  in Experiment one and
between 400 and 1200 ms  in Experiment two. However, there were
no signiﬁcant differences between probes and irrelevants in the
innocent or uncooperative phases in either time-window and in
either experiment. These whole-head PLS results thus captured the
same P300 pattern as the focal parietal analysis (with the excep-
tion that the P300 difference between probes and irrelevants in
Experiment two did not reach signiﬁcance in the whole-head anal-
ysis), with no additional ERP indications of guilt across the global
spatiotemporal data when participants were uncooperative and
suppressing crime recall.
3.4.  Final recall resultsBaseline 0.60 0.04 0.62 0.04
Object Recall 0.67 0.05 0.46 0.05
Suppress 0.52 0.05 0.41 0.05
Baseline 0.46 0.04 0.40 0.04
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later retention of the tested memories. Compared to recall for
objects in the cooperative phase, objects repeatedly cued in the
uncooperative phase showed reliably poorer memory, indicating
4 There was a trend for more negative ERPs across frontal sites for probes in the
same  time-window as the parietal P300, particularly in the cooperative phase (see
scalp maps in Fig. 1). These frontal negativities were thus not speciﬁcally related toZ.M. Bergström et al. / Bio
ffects or interactions. When participants were asked to recall
hich objects appeared in each room, there was  a main effect of
ondition (F(2,92) = 11.4, P < 0.001, Partial 2 = 0.20), but no inter-
ction with experiment (F(2,92) = 1.2, P > 0.3, Partial 2 = 0.03). The
ondition main effect was caused by signiﬁcantly higher object
ecall accuracy (against a Bonferroni corrected  ˛ = 0.0167 for three
amily-wise post hoc tests) for repeatedly recalled objects than
or repeatedly suppressed items (t(47) = 2.5, P < 0.0167, d = 0.37)
nd for baseline items (t(47) = 5.0, P < 0.001, d = 0.68), and trend-
evel higher object accuracy for suppressed than baseline items
t(47) = 2.0, P = 0.046, d = 0.27) collapsed across experiments.
.  Discussion
The current research is the ﬁrst demonstration that memory-
elated brain activity normally elicited by reminders of incrim-
nating knowledge can be intentionally suppressed. In line with
ypical guilty knowledge research, we used exceedingly strong
etrieval cues as crime probes – object words as reminders of
laborately encoded object pictures – which would have greatly
agniﬁed recall prepotency compared to previously published
etrieval suppression studies (Anderson et al., 2004; Bergström
t al., 2007, 2009a, 2009b; Depue et al., 2007; Hanslmayr et al.,
009; Mecklinger et al., 2009). Moreover, ERPs to these powerful
ues were compared with ERPs to previously unseen control items,
nlikely to elicit memory-related brain activity. Despite these chal-
enges, suppression of parietal ERP positivity was highly successful,
educing detection rates of guilty individuals.
.1. Theoretical implications
Importantly,  voluntary modulations of parietal ERP amplitudes
ere speciﬁc to crime probes, with no signiﬁcant modulations of
RPs to targets or control items across phases in either experiment.
his result is noteworthy because it conﬁrms that the probe ERP
ffects were unlikely due to some phase-generic process, such as
articipants paying less attention to all items in the uncooperative
hase. Rather, the ERP differences between probes across cooper-
tive and uncooperative phases can be conﬁdently interpreted as
uccessful voluntary modulations of memory-speciﬁc brain activ-
ty. In fact, when we presented frequent reminders of a crime,
uilty participants’ efforts to suppress retrieval rendered parietal
mplitudes indistinguishable from those exhibited when they were
nnocent. This similarity of ERP proﬁles across the uncooperative
nd innocent phases suggests that when probes and irrelevants
re equally probable, suspects can voluntarily suppress retrieval
nd modulate neural responses to crime probes, disguising stored
nowledge so that they appear innocent. This result is thus an
mportant extension on previous ﬁndings that the late parietal ERP
ositivity that is typically interpreted as a correlate of episodic rec-
llection is largely under voluntary control (Bergström et al., 2007,
009a, 2009b; Dzulkiﬂi & Wilding, 2005; Hanslmayr et al., 2009;
erron & Rugg, 2003; Mecklinger et al., 2009). This ability to con-
rol retrieval may  originate, in part, from the previously established
apacity to intentionally modulate mnemonic activity in the medial
emporal lobes and other brain areas involved in memory repre-
entation and retrieval (Anderson et al., 2004; Benoit & Anderson,
012; Butler & James, 2010; Depue et al., 2007; Levy & Anderson,
012).
In a second experiment, we reduced the probability of crime
eminders to make them subjectively unexpected, in order to inves-
igate whether probability-sensitive parietal ERP effects would
e amenable to suppression. This issue is important because
he majority of GKT applications use low-probability designs.
 signiﬁcant proportion of participants successfully concealedl Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11 9
crime memories even under these more demanding circum-
stances, although suppression was  somewhat less pronounced than
with equal probability crime reminders. This ﬁnding suggests a
boundary condition for voluntary control of memory-related brain
activity, indicating that subjective expectedness is an important
factor for suppression success.
The precise functional signiﬁcance of this result is how-
ever unclear, because parietal ERP positivities in the P300
time-window are thought to index additive contributions from
multiple independent sources (Johnson, 1986). In memory
tasks, probability-sensitive cognitive processes related to stim-
ulus evaluation (e.g. Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965) and
probability-insensitive cognitive processes that track episodic rec-
ollection success (e.g. Vilberg et al., 2006) may both produce ERP
positivities that overlap at parietal scalp regions. It is therefore pos-
sible that varying the probe probability across experiments may
have changed the relative contributions of these underlying com-
ponent processes to scalp amplitudes. In Experiment one, parietal
ERP positivities may  have primarily been related to episodic rec-
ollection (ER). In Experiment two, the enhanced P300 amplitudes
may have been the result of additive episodic recollection and
probability-related ‘oddball’ (O) processes (i.e. ER + O). One specu-
lative interpretation of our data is that these distinct processes are
differentially susceptible to voluntary control mechanisms, with
the episodic recollection-related ER component being more sus-
ceptible than the probability-sensitive O component. This account
could explain why  the relative difference between cooperative
(ER+) and uncooperative (ER−) probes was  similar across the two
experiments even though ERP amplitudes to probes were overall
enhanced in both conditions in Experiment two (O+). Alternatively,
infrequent reminders may  simply make it more difﬁcult to engage
the cognitive control mechanisms required to suppress retrieval
due to a lack of preparation (cf. Hanslmayr et al., 2009) or practice.
In a data-driven whole-head analysis, we  tested for alternative
ERP effects that might have been used to diagnose guilt when the
P300 was suppressed, such as effects related to the cognitive control
processes recruited to suppress retrieval. Surprisingly, even though
the behavioural data and self-reports indicated that retrieval sup-
pression required a great deal of effort, this analysis failed to reveal
reliable evidence of control-related ERP effects,4 in contrast to pre-
vious literature (Bergström et al., 2009a, 2009b; Hanslmayr et al.,
2009; Mecklinger et al., 2009). One explanation for this discrep-
ancy may  be that previous research has required participants to
switch on a trial-by-trial basis between suppressing and retriev-
ing information from the same event context, whereas the current
task required participants to suppress crime retrieval across an
entire phase of the experiment. Such blocked retrieval suppression
may involve more sustained patterns of brain activation than those
observed in prior research. Sustained brain activity can be difﬁcult
to measure with ERPs, since ERPs are primarily sensitive to tran-
sient brain activity patterns that are time-locked to the onset of
externally deﬁned events.
The ﬁnal recall test conducted after the guilt detection phase
conﬁrmed that the retrieval suppression manipulation affectedsuppression, but rather seemed inversely related to parietal P300 positivities, and
thus may  reﬂect the negative pole of a dipolar ﬁeld stemming from the same gener-
ator as the P300. Since the frontal negativities did not provide additional diagnostic
information  regarding guilt or innocence in our data (although see Farwell & Smith,
2001) we  do not report further on these effects.
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hat participants were able to limit crime recall despite repeated
eminders. However, suppressed items were still somewhat
trengthened compared to baseline objects that were never pre-
ented in the intermediate GKT task. This result contrasts with
revious ﬁndings that repeatedly suppressing retrieval in response
o a reminder can signiﬁcantly impair recall performance of the
voided memories compared to baseline (e.g. Anderson & Green,
001; Anderson et al., 2004; Bergström et al., 2009b; Depue et al.,
007). The trend level enhancement for suppressed items rela-
ive to baseline items independently conﬁrms the subjectively very
igh difﬁculty participants reported for the recall suppression task,
onﬁrming that the mnemonic control evident in reduced pari-
tal amplitude was the product of effortful control. Such great
ntrusiveness was expected, given that the cues directly referred
o the objects themselves and thus likely shared many overlap-
ing features with the to-be-suppressed memories (see Anderson
 Spellman, 1995). Therefore, retrieval suppression is likely to be
ore difﬁcult with the overlapping cues used in GKT compared
o the non-overlapping cue-associate pairs used in other memory
uppression research (e.g. Anderson & Green, 2001). Nevertheless,
t is possible that under a different protocol, criminals may  be able
o suppress memories of their crime to the point of signiﬁcant
elow-baseline forgetting.
.2.  Practical implications
A  few previous studies have shown that countermeasures can
egrade ERP-based memory guilt detection. Some have involved
raining participants on covert responses to irrelevant control items
e.g. Rosenfeld et al., 2004, 2008; Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2010),
ith the aim of increasing P300s to irrelevants and thus making
robes and irrelevants more similar. Others have trained partici-
ants to make additional covert responses to target items in order
o enhance their relative salience, thereby reducing the atten-
ional resources available for processing of probes and irrelevants
Mertens & Allen, 2008). Importantly, no previous studies have
ssessed whether memory-related brain activity in response to crime
eminders can be voluntarily and speciﬁcally controlled. Our study
s thus the ﬁrst to challenge the critical assumption that memory-
elated brain activity is automatically elicited when suspects are
resented with crime reminders. The current results show that this
ssumption of memory detection tests is not always justiﬁed.
The  generalizability of our ﬁndings is somewhat complicated
y the multitude of different guilty knowledge protocols and clas-
iﬁcation techniques that have been developed by different groups
e.g. Allen et al., 1992; Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld et al.,
991, 2004). Although we kept our design as similar as possible to
he type of protocol that has arguably been the most prevalent in
he GKT literature, we did introduce some novel design elements
n order to be able to manipulate retrieval suppression and investi-
ate subsequent effects on memory (Anderson & Green, 2001). For
xample, we employed a very elaborate encoding phase to ensure
hat crime memories would be highly intrusive, and our manip-
lation used different instructions from practical applications of
KT research. The majority of applied GKT procedures use low
robability probes, so although our ﬁrst experiment was  theoret-
cally important for prior memory suppression work, the second
xperiment with low probability probes was most relevant to prac-
ical applications. Therefore, whilst our design emphasised internal
alidity, aspects of the design had reduced ecological validity. Fur-
hermore, newly developed protocols have been demonstrated as
ore accurate and resistant to other types of countermeasuresRosenfeld et al., 2008; Rosenfeld & Labkovsky, 2010). Whether or
ot retrieval suppression can be successfully applied in these alter-
ative protocols is an empirical question. Further research is also
equired to determine whether suppression attempts can reducel Psychology 94 (2013) 1– 11
guilt  detection based on behavioural or ANS measures of memory
(reviewed in Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003).
It is also crucial that suppression countermeasures are assessed
outside the laboratory. First, memories of a real crime may  dif-
fer in intrusiveness from those of a crime simulation, which could
affect suppression success. Second, real criminals will likely differ
in their motivation to control retrieval from typical research vol-
unteers. Since our aim was to experimentally demonstrate people’s
capacity to control memory-related brain activity, we manipulated
whether our volunteers should retrieve or suppress crime memo-
ries. Of course, in a real crime setting, a suspect is more likely to
attempt to suppress than intentionally retrieve crime memories.
In contrast, volunteers participating in lab-based studies on guilty
knowledge testing are likely more cooperative than real crimi-
nal suspects. Typical research volunteers without countermeasure
instructions will have little motivation to suppress retrieval, and
may  even intentionally retrieve crime memories in response to
demand characteristics (e.g. Orne, 1962). Such cooperation from
volunteers would lead to an over-estimation of the test’s ability to
detect memories in a real crime setting.
Nevertheless, despite methodological differences, the current
research has important practical implications because it challenges
the assumption that memory-related brain activity is outside of vol-
untary control, and hence more resistant to countermeasures than
other physiological and behavioural measures (e.g. Lykken, 1998;
see Ben-Shakhar, 2011). Our ﬁndings showed an unprecedented
degree of success at intentional control over memory-related brain
activity, with little special training, and that this control can be
marshalled as an effective countermeasure during memory detec-
tion tests. These results thus demonstrate that in principle, retrieval
suppression poses a challenge to guilt detection tests that rely on
brain-activity markers of memory.
The ability of uncooperative suspects motivated to disguise
their guilt to suppress memory-related neural activity established
here raises concerns regarding the validity of ERP-based memory
detection tests as a means to establish criminal guilt or innocence.
Together with previous evidence (Mertens & Allen, 2008; Rosenfeld
et al., 2004), the current ﬁndings point to a speciﬁc problem with
enhanced false negatives in memory detection tests, meaning it is
particularly risky to conclude that a suspect is innocent based on a
negative result. These concerns are important because it has been
argued that ERP P300-based methods can reliably demonstrate that
a suspect lacks knowledge of a crime, and that these techniques
have been instrumental in winning the release of criminal suspects
in real legal cases (see McCall, 2004). Although not every participant
managed to avoid detection under all circumstances, our results
indicate that, even under situations most favourable for guilt detec-
tion, at least an additional 20% of guilty criminal suspects could
be misclassiﬁed and potentially set free as a result of intentional
retrieval suppression, which may  have dire real life consequences.
Although scepticism has prevailed when this type of evidence has
been considered in US legal cases, both the methods and their legal
standing are still evolving, as recently noted in Science Magazine
(Miller, 2010).
5.  Conclusions
Across two experiments, we have demonstrated that the
absence of a reliably enhanced brain response to crime reminders
is not unequivocal evidence that relevant memories are absent in
that person’s brain. Instead, the presence or absence of memory-
related brain activity appears to primarily track whether that
person is having a subjective experience of remembering (cf. Allen
& Mertens, 2009; Rissman et al., 2010). An absence of memory-
related brain activity to reminders thus indicates that suspects are
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ot remembering an associated crime at that speciﬁc time, but does
ot determine that they have no such crime memories stored in
heir brain. An innocent verdict in a guilty knowledge test could
rise because a suspect is truly innocent, because they have for-
otten the particular details of the crime that are being tested, or
ecause they are highly motivated to disguise their knowledge and
re intentionally suppressing crime memories.
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